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The Theory of Moral Sentiments · Chapters

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Chapter companions for The Theory of Moral Sentiments by Adam Smith.

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  1. Chapter 1

    Advertisement to the Sixth Edition

    Smith explains that since the first publication in 1759, he has made several corrections and illustrations to the work, but was prevented from revising it until now due to various occupations. He outlines the principal alterations: a new chapter in Part I, four new chapters in Part III, an entirely new Part VI, and reorganization of passages on Stoical philosophy in Part VII. He also notes minor corrections and reaffirms his intention to write a theory of jurisprudence, though he acknowledges his advanced age makes completion uncertain.

  2. Chapter 2

    The Theory of Moral Sentiments

    This chapter introduces the foundational concept of sympathy as the basis for moral judgment, exploring how individuals evaluate their own and others' actions through an imagined impartial spectator. It examines the interplay between self-love and social order, the distinction between praiseworthiness and mere praise, and the role of propriety and virtue in shaping moral sentiments.

  3. Chapter 3

    Part I: Of the Propriety of Action

    This chapter introduces the concept of propriety in action, exploring how sympathy forms the basis for moral judgment and how we assess the appropriateness of emotions and behaviors in ourselves and others.

  4. Chapter 4

    Section I: Of the Sense of Propriety

    This section explores the foundation of moral judgment in sympathy, explaining how we approve or disapprove of others' passions based on our ability to sympathize with them. It introduces the concept of the impartial spectator and distinguishes between the amiable and respectable virtues.

  5. Chapter 5

    I: Of Sympathy

    Smith introduces sympathy as a fundamental principle of human nature, arguing that even the most selfish individuals possess an innate concern for others. He explains that sympathy arises not from witnessing the passion itself but from imagining ourselves in the sufferer's situation, and he illustrates this with examples ranging from physical reactions to the plight of the insane and the dead.

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  1. Chapter 6Of the Pleasure of Mutual Sympathy
  2. Chapter 7Of the Manner in Which We Judge of the Propriety or Impropriety of the Affections of Other Men, by Their Concord or Dissonance with Our Own
  3. Chapter 8The Same Subject Continued
  4. Chapter 9Of the Amiable and Respectable Virtues
  5. Chapter 10Section II: Of the Degrees of the Different Passions Which Are Consistent with Propriety
  6. Chapter 11Of the Passions Which Take Their Origin from the Body
  7. Chapter 12II: Of Those Passions Which Take Their Origin from a Particular Turn or Habit of the Imagination
  8. Chapter 13Of the Unsocial Passions
  9. Chapter 14IV: Of the Social Passions
  10. Chapter 15Of the Selfish Passions
  11. Chapter 16Section III: Of the Effects of Prosperity and Adversity Upon the Judgment of Mankind with Regard to the Propriety of Action; and Why It Is More Easy to Obtain Their Approbation in the One State Than in the Other
  12. Chapter 17I: That Though Our Sympathy with Sorrow Is Generally a More Lively Sensation Than Our Sympathy with Joy, It Commonly Falls Much More Short of the Violence of What Is Naturally Felt by the Person Principally Concerned
  13. Chapter 18II: Of the Origin of Ambition, and of the Distinction of Ranks
  14. Chapter 19III: Of the Corruption of Our Moral Sentiments, Which Is Occasioned by This Disposition to Admire the Rich and the Great, and to Despise or Neglect Persons of Poor and Mean Condition
  15. Chapter 20Part II: Of Merit and Demerit; or, of the Objects of Reward and Punishment
  16. Chapter 21Section I: Of the Sense of Merit and Demerit
  17. Chapter 22I: That Whatever Appears to Be the Proper Object of Gratitude, Appears to Deserve Reward; and That, in the Same Manner, Whatever Appears to Be the Proper Object of Resentment, Appears to Deserve Punishment
  18. Chapter 23II: Of the Proper Objects of Gratitude and Resentment
  19. Chapter 24III: That Where There Is No Approbation of the Conduct of the Person Who Confers the Benefit, There Is Little Sympathy with the Gratitude of Him Who Receives It: And That, on the Contrary, Where There Is No Disapprobation of the Motives of the Person Who Does the Mischief, There Is No Sort of Sympathy with the Resentment of Him Who Suffers It
  20. Chapter 25IV: Recapitulation of the Foregoing Chapters
  21. Chapter 26V: The Analysis of the Sense of Merit and Demerit
  22. Chapter 27Section II: Of Justice and Beneficence
  23. Chapter 28I: Comparison of Those Two Virtues
  24. Chapter 29II: Of the Sense of Justice, of Remorse, and of the Consciousness of Merit
  25. Chapter 30III: Of the Utility of This Constitution of Nature
  26. Chapter 31Section III: Of the Influence of Fortune Upon the Sentiments of Mankind, with Regard to the Merit or Demerit of Their Actions
  27. Chapter 32Of the Causes of This Influence of Fortune
  28. Chapter 33Of the Extent of This Influence of Fortune
  29. Chapter 34III: Of the Final Cause of This Irregularity of Sentiments
  30. Chapter 35Part III: Of the Foundation of Our Judgments Concerning Our Own Sentiments and Conduct, and of the Sense of Duty
  31. Chapter 36Of the Principle of Self-Approbation and of Self-Disapprobation
  32. Chapter 37II: Of the Love of Praise, and of That of Praiseworthiness; and of the Dread of Blame, and of That of Blameworthiness
  33. Chapter 38Of the Influence and Authority of Conscience
  34. Chapter 39Of the Nature of Self-Deceit, and of the Origin and Use of General Rules
  35. Chapter 40V: Of the Influence and Authority of the General Rules of Morality, and That They Are Justly Regarded as the Laws of the Deity
  36. Chapter 41VI: In What Cases the Sense of Duty Ought to Be the Sole Principle of Our Conduct; and in What Cases It Ought to Concur with Other Motives
  37. Chapter 42Part IV: Of the Effect of Utility Upon the Sentiment of Approbation
  38. Chapter 43Of the Beauty Which the Appearance of Utility Bestows Upon All the Productions of Art, and of the Extensive Influence of This Species of Beauty
  39. Chapter 44Of the Beauty Which the Appearance of Utility Bestows Upon the Characters and the Actions of Men; and How Far the Perception of This Beauty May Be Regarded as One of the Original Principles of Approbation
  40. Chapter 45Part V: Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion Upon the Sentiments of Moral Approbation and Disapprobation
  41. Chapter 46I: Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion Upon Our Notions of Beauty and Deformity
  42. Chapter 47II: Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion Upon Moral Sentiments
  43. Chapter 48Part VI: Of the Character of Virtue
  44. Chapter 49Section I: Of the Character of the Individual, So Far as It Affects His Own Happiness; or of Prudence
  45. Chapter 50Section II: Of the Character of the Individual, So Far as It Can Affect the Happiness of Other People
  46. Chapter 51I: Of the Order in Which Individuals Are Recommended by Nature to Our Care and Attention
  47. Chapter 52II: Of the Order in Which Societies Are by Nature Recommended to Our Beneficence
  48. Chapter 53III: Of Universal Benevolence
  49. Chapter 54Section III: Of Self-Command
  50. Chapter 55Conclusion of the Sixth Part
  51. Chapter 56Part VII: Of Systems of Moral Philosophy
  52. Chapter 57Section I: Of the Questions Which Ought to Be Examined in a Theory of Moral Sentiments
  53. Chapter 58Section II: Of the Different Accounts Which Have Been Given of the Nature of Virtue
  54. Chapter 59Of Those Systems Which Make Virtue Consist in Propriety
  55. Chapter 60Of Those Systems Which Make Virtue Consist in Prudence
  56. Chapter 61Of Those Systems Which Make Virtue Consist in Benevolence
  57. Chapter 62IV: Of Licentious Systems
  58. Chapter 63Section III: Of the Different Systems Which Have Been Formed Concerning the Principle of Approbation
  59. Chapter 64Of Those Systems Which Deduce the Principle of Approbation from Self-Love
  60. Chapter 65Of Those Systems Which Make Reason the Principle of Approbation
  61. Chapter 66III: Of Those Systems Which Make Sentiment the Principle of Approbation
  62. Chapter 67Section IV: Of the Manner in Which Different Authors Have Treated of the Practical Rules of Morality
  63. Chapter 68Considerations Concerning the First Formation of Languages
  64. Chapter 69Endnotes
The Theory of Moral Sentiments — Chapters Explained