The Theory of Moral Sentiments · Chapter
Of the Passions Which Take Their Origin from the Body explained
Smith examines the passions that arise from bodily states, such as hunger, sexual desire, and pain, arguing that they are considered indecent because spectators cannot readily sympathize with them.
What happens
Smith examines the passions that arise from bodily states, such as hunger, sexual desire, and pain, arguing that they are considered indecent because spectators cannot readily sympathize with them. He contrasts these with passions originating from the imagination, which evoke stronger sympathy due to the mind's flexibility. The chapter explores the virtue of temperance in restraining bodily appetites and the admiration for constancy in enduring physical pain.
Free preview opens on this chapter — companions, themes, and character notes appear beside the text.
Narrative arc
Story tension across the book — this chapter sits in Exposition.
- Setup
- Escalation
- Breaking point
- Aftermath
- Closing
This passage marks the dramatic climax because it crystallizes the core psychological crisis: the tension betw…
Full beat labels and climax notes unlock in the reader.
Follow the arc while readingThemes in this chapter
- Sympathy as the Foundation of Moral Judgment
Smith argues that bodily passions fail to elicit sympathy from spectators, forming the basis for moral judgments of indecency and propriety.
- Virtue as Propriety and Self-Command
Temperance is defined as restraining bodily appetites within bounds of propriety, and constancy in pain is admired as a virtue of self-command.
Characters to notice
- Hercules
Mentioned as an example of a figure enduring severe tortures in Greek tragedy, where his suffering is interesting only because death is foreseen.
Key passages
“It is indecent to express any strong degree of those passions which arise from a certain situation or disposition of the body; because the company, not being in the same disposition, cannot be expected to sympathize with them.”
Expressing strong bodily passions is improper because others, not sharing the same physical state, cannot sympathize.
This establishes the core argument that sympathy is limited for body-originating passions.
“The true cause of the peculiar disgust which we conceive for the appetites of the body when we see them in other men, is that we cannot enter into them.”
Our disgust at others' bodily appetites stems from our inability to share those feelings.
Highlights the lack of sympathy as the root of moral aversion.
“It is quite otherwise with those passions which take their origin from the imagination. The frame of my body can be but little affected by the alterations which are brought about upon that of my companion: but my imagination is more ductile, and more readily assumes, if I may say so, the shape and configuration of the imaginations of those with whom I am familiar.”
Imagination-based passions evoke more sympathy because the mind can easily adapt to another's imaginative state, unlike the body.
Contrasts bodily and imaginative passions to explain differing sympathy levels.
“The little sympathy which we feel with bodily pain, is the foundation of the propriety of constancy and patience in enduring it.”
Our limited sympathy for physical pain underlies why steady endurance of such pain is considered proper and admirable.
Connects lack of sympathy to the virtue of self-command in suffering.
