The Theory of Moral Sentiments · Chapter
V: The Analysis of the Sense of Merit and Demerit explained
This chapter analyzes the sense of merit and demerit as compounded sentiments.
What happens
This chapter analyzes the sense of merit and demerit as compounded sentiments. Merit arises from a direct sympathy with the agent's motives and an indirect sympathy with the gratitude of the recipient. Demerit arises from a direct antipathy to the agent's motives and an indirect sympathy with the resentment of the sufferer. The chapter illustrates these sentiments through historical examples of beneficent and cruel actions.
Free preview opens on this chapter — companions, themes, and character notes appear beside the text.
Narrative arc
Story tension across the book — this chapter sits in Falling action.
- Setup
- Escalation
- Breaking point
- Aftermath
- Closing
This passage marks the dramatic climax because it crystallizes the core psychological crisis: the tension betw…
Full beat labels and climax notes unlock in the reader.
Follow the arc while readingThemes in this chapter
- Sympathy as the Foundation of Moral Judgment
The chapter elaborates on how direct and indirect sympathy form the basis for our sense of merit and demerit.
- Justice as the Pillar of Society vs. Beneficence as Ornament
The discussion of merit (beneficence) and demerit (injustice) highlights the distinction between virtuous actions and the punishment of crimes.
Characters to notice
- Scipio Nasica
Mentioned as an example of a beneficent figure whose actions inspire direct sympathy and indirect sympathy with the gratitude of those he helped.
- Caesar
Referenced as 'a Borgia or a Nero' to exemplify perfidy and cruelty, evoking direct antipathy and indirect sympathy with the resentment of sufferers.
Key passages
“As our sense, therefore, of the propriety of conduct arises from what I shall call a direct sympathy with the affections and motives of the person who acts, so our sense of its merit arises from what I shall call an indirect sympathy with the gratitude of the person who is, if I may say so, acted upon.”
Our judgment of proper conduct comes from directly sympathizing with the actor's motives, while our judgment of merit comes from indirectly sympathizing with the recipient's gratitude.
This introduces the core distinction between direct and indirect sympathy in moral evaluation.
“In the same manner as our sense of the impropriety of conduct arises from a want of sympathy, or from a direct antipathy to the affections and motives of the agent, so our sense of its demerit arises from what I shall here too call an indirect sympathy with the resentment of the sufferer.”
Just as we judge improper conduct by lacking sympathy or feeling antipathy toward the agent's motives, we judge demerit by indirectly sympathizing with the victim's resentment.
This parallels the structure of merit, applying it to negative moral judgments.
