The Theory of Moral Sentiments · Chapter
III: Of the Final Cause of This Irregularity of Sentiments explained
Smith examines why human moral sentiments are irregularly influenced by the actual consequences of actions, rather than solely by intentions.
What happens
Smith examines why human moral sentiments are irregularly influenced by the actual consequences of actions, rather than solely by intentions. He argues that this irregularity, though seemingly unjust, serves a vital social purpose: it restrains punishment to outward actions (not mere thoughts), encourages active virtue over indolent benevolence, and ultimately reflects divine wisdom in ordering human nature for the happiness and perfection of the species.
Free preview opens on this chapter — companions, themes, and character notes appear beside the text.
Narrative arc
Story tension across the book — this chapter sits in Falling action.
- Setup
- Escalation
- Breaking point
- Aftermath
- Closing
This passage marks the dramatic climax because it crystallizes the core psychological crisis: the tension betw…
Full beat labels and climax notes unlock in the reader.
Follow the arc while readingThemes in this chapter
- Justice as the Pillar of Society vs. Beneficence as Ornament
Smith distinguishes between punishment for harmful actions (justice) and the imperfect reward for mere good intentions (beneficence), arguing that only actions that produce or attempt evil are proper objects of human punishment.
- Corruption of Moral Sentiments by Wealth and Rank
Though not directly about wealth, the chapter addresses how the 'irregularity of sentiments'—judging by event rather than design—can discourage virtue and distort moral evaluation, a theme related to the corruption of moral sentiments.
Characters to notice
- Socrates
Referenced indirectly through the dramatic examples of Oedipus and Jocasta, which are drawn from Greek tragedy, a context familiar to Socrates.
Key passages
“Man was made for action, and to promote by the exertion of his faculties such changes in the external circumstances both of himself and others, as may seem most favourable to the happiness of all.”
Human beings are designed for active engagement in the world, using their abilities to improve the conditions of themselves and others for the common good.
Smith emphasizes that virtue requires actual deeds, not just good intentions.
“That necessary rule of justice, therefore, that men in this life are liable to punishment for their actions only, not for their designs and intentions, is founded upon this salutary and useful irregularity in human sentiments concerning merit or demerit.”
The legal principle that only actions, not thoughts, can be punished is based on this seemingly flawed but beneficial tendency in human moral feelings.
Smith justifies the legal distinction between intent and act by appealing to the natural irregularity of moral sentiments.
