The Theory of Moral Sentiments · Chapter
Part III: Of the Foundation of Our Judgments Concerning Our Own Sentiments and Conduct, and of the Sense of Duty explained
This part examines how we judge our own sentiments and conduct by imagining how an impartial spectator would view them, introducing the concept of the impartial spectator as the basis for self-approbation and self-disapprobation, and explor
What happens
This part examines how we judge our own sentiments and conduct by imagining how an impartial spectator would view them, introducing the concept of the impartial spectator as the basis for self-approbation and self-disapprobation, and explores the sense of duty derived from general rules of morality.
Free preview opens on this chapter — companions, themes, and character notes appear beside the text.
Narrative arc
Story tension across the book — this chapter sits in Falling action.
- Setup
- Escalation
- Breaking point
- Aftermath
- Closing
This passage marks the dramatic climax because it crystallizes the core psychological crisis: the tension betw…
Full beat labels and climax notes unlock in the reader.
Follow the arc while readingThemes in this chapter
- The Impartial Spectator
Central to this part, Smith develops the idea that we judge our own conduct by imagining how an impartial spectator would view it.
- Desire for Praiseworthiness vs. Mere Praise
Explored in the context of self-judgment and the distinction between deserving praise and merely receiving it.
Characters to notice
Key passages
“We suppose ourselves the spectators of our own behaviour, and endeavour to imagine what effect it would, in this light, produce upon us.”
We imagine how an impartial observer would react to our actions and use that imagined reaction to judge ourselves.
This introduces the core mechanism of self-judgment through the impartial spectator.
“The man who acts according to the rules of perfect prudence, of strict justice, and of proper benevolence, may be said to be perfectly virtuous.”
A person who follows the rules of prudence, justice, and benevolence is considered fully virtuous.
Smith defines virtue in terms of adherence to these moral rules.
