Themes & patterns

The Theory of Moral Sentiments

Smith argues that moral approval or disapproval arises from our capacity to sympathize with the motives and feelings of others, forming the core of moral evaluation.

Part I: Of the Propriety of Action

Smith argues that sympathy—our ability to share the feelings of others—is the basis for judging the propriety of actions.

Section I: Of the Sense of Propriety

The chapter introduces sympathy as the mechanism through which we approve or disapprove of others' passions.

I: Of Sympathy

Smith defines sympathy as fellow-feeling with any passion, not just sorrow, and argues it is the basis for moral judgment through imagining ourselves in another's situation.

Of the Pleasure of Mutual Sympathy

The chapter introduces sympathy as a natural principle that grounds moral approval and disapproval, emphasizing the pleasure of mutual fellow-feeling and the pain of its absence.

Of the Manner in Which We Judge of the Propriety or Impropriety of the Affections of Other Men, by Their Concord or Dissonance with Our Own

The chapter argues that approval or disapproval of others' passions is fundamentally based on the concord or dissonance with our own sympathetic emotions, establishing sympathy as the core mechanism of moral judgment.

The Theory of Moral Sentiments

The concept of an impartial spectator within each person is introduced as the mechanism for self-judgment and moral conscience.

Part I: Of the Propriety of Action

The concept of an impartial spectator is introduced as a mechanism for self-evaluation and moral judgment.

Section I: Of the Sense of Propriety

The concept of an impartial spectator is introduced as the standard for propriety in moral judgments.

Of the Manner in Which We Judge of the Propriety or Impropriety of the Affections of Other Men, by Their Concord or Dissonance with Our Own

The discussion of how we judge others by bringing their case home to our own breast and using our own sentiments as a standard implicitly introduces the concept of an impartial spectator within ourselves.

The Same Subject Continued

Smith elaborates on how individuals view their own situation through the eyes of others, adjusting their passions to achieve concord with spectators, a core mechanism of the impartial spectator.

Of the Amiable and Respectable Virtues

The impartial spectator is central to the chapter's analysis, as the standard for self-command and the basis for judging the propriety of emotions and actions.

Of the Amiable and Respectable Virtues

The chapter explicitly defines amiable virtues as stemming from sensibility and respectable virtues as stemming from self-command, emphasizing that virtue is excellence beyond common propriety.

Section II: Of the Degrees of the Different Passions Which Are Consistent with Propriety

The discussion of mediocrity in passions and the distinction between decent and indecent expressions relates to the concept of propriety as a measure of virtue.

Of the Passions Which Take Their Origin from the Body

Temperance is defined as restraining bodily appetites within bounds of propriety, and constancy in pain is admired as a virtue of self-command.

Of the Unsocial Passions

The chapter highlights magnanimity and self-command as essential for ennobling the expression of unsocial passions like anger and resentment.

IV: Of the Social Passions

The chapter contrasts the propriety of benevolent affections with the impropriety of excessive hatred and resentment, which are deemed unfit for civil society.

I: That Though Our Sympathy with Sorrow Is Generally a More Lively Sensation Than Our Sympathy with Joy, It Commonly Falls Much More Short of the Violence of What Is Naturally Felt by the Person Principally Concerned

The chapter highlights the propriety of mastering sorrow in adversity, as seen in Cato and Socrates, and the admiration such self-command elicits.

Part II: Of Merit and Demerit; or, of the Objects of Reward and Punishment

The distinction between merit (reward) and demerit (punishment) lays the groundwork for understanding justice as essential to social order.

Section I: Of the Sense of Merit and Demerit

The introduction of merit (reward) and demerit (punishment) lays groundwork for later distinctions between justice and beneficence.

I: That Whatever Appears to Be the Proper Object of Gratitude, Appears to Deserve Reward; and That, in the Same Manner, Whatever Appears to Be the Proper Object of Resentment, Appears to Deserve Punishment

The chapter discusses reward and punishment as grounded in gratitude and resentment, which are foundational to justice and social order.

V: The Analysis of the Sense of Merit and Demerit

The discussion of merit (beneficence) and demerit (injustice) highlights the distinction between virtuous actions and the punishment of crimes.

Section II: Of Justice and Beneficence

Smith argues that justice is essential for the existence of society, while beneficence is a desirable but not enforceable virtue.

I: Comparison of Those Two Virtues

Smith contrasts justice, which is enforceable and negative, with beneficence, which is free and positive. Justice prevents harm and is the proper object of resentment and punishment; beneficence excites gratitude and reward but cannot be compelled.

Section III: Of the Effects of Prosperity and Adversity Upon the Judgment of Mankind with Regard to the Propriety of Action; and Why It Is More Easy to Obtain Their Approbation in the One State Than in the Other

The chapter explores how prosperity biases moral judgment, making it easier to gain approbation in success than in adversity.

II: Of the Origin of Ambition, and of the Distinction of Ranks

Smith argues that the natural disposition to sympathize with joy rather than sorrow leads us to admire the rich and powerful for their station, not their virtue, corrupting moral judgment.

III: Of the Corruption of Our Moral Sentiments, Which Is Occasioned by This Disposition to Admire the Rich and the Great, and to Despise or Neglect Persons of Poor and Mean Condition

The central theme of the chapter: the disposition to admire the rich and powerful corrupts moral judgments, leading people to value wealth over virtue.

III: Of the Final Cause of This Irregularity of Sentiments

Though not directly about wealth, the chapter addresses how the 'irregularity of sentiments'—judging by event rather than design—can discourage virtue and distort moral evaluation, a theme related to the corruption of moral sentiments.

Of the Beauty Which the Appearance of Utility Bestows Upon All the Productions of Art, and of the Extensive Influence of This Species of Beauty

The chapter examines how admiration for the rich and great often focuses on the 'artful adjustment' of means rather than genuine happiness, leading to a misplaced valuation of wealth and status.

Section I: Of the Character of the Individual, So Far as It Affects His Own Happiness; or of Prudence

The desire for rank and credit among equals is a stronger motive for acquiring fortune than mere bodily necessities, and great conquerors are admired despite their violence.

Part V: Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion Upon the Sentiments of Moral Approbation and Disapprobation

The chapter is entirely dedicated to exploring how custom and fashion affect moral approbation and disapprobation, shaping our perceptions of virtue and propriety.

I: Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion Upon Our Notions of Beauty and Deformity

The chapter centrally argues that custom and fashion shape our notions of beauty and deformity, and by extension moral sentiments, leading to varied judgments across cultures and times.

II: Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion Upon Moral Sentiments

Smith argues that custom and fashion shape our moral sentiments, though they cannot entirely overturn our natural sense of right and wrong. He illustrates this with examples from different professions, nations, and historical periods.

Of the Pleasure of Mutual Sympathy

Smith directly critiques the view that sympathy arises from self-interested considerations, arguing instead that it is an immediate and disinterested source of pleasure and pain.

Of the Selfish Passions

Smith discusses how envy and self-interest shape responses to sudden fortune, and how the upstart's behavior reflects awareness of others' self-love.

II: Of the Origin of Ambition, and of the Distinction of Ranks

The pursuit of wealth and rank is driven by vanity and the desire for attention, which underpins social emulation and the distinction of ranks.

III: Of the Corruption of Our Moral Sentiments, Which Is Occasioned by This Disposition to Admire the Rich and the Great, and to Despise or Neglect Persons of Poor and Mean Condition

The admiration of the rich and great is described as necessary for maintaining social distinctions, linking self-love to the structure of society.

Of the Influence and Authority of Conscience

Smith examines the tension between natural self-love and the need for social harmony, arguing that conscience overrides selfish impulses to maintain justice and propriety.

Of the Nature of Self-Deceit, and of the Origin and Use of General Rules

Smith examines how self-love leads to partial judgments and self-deceit, but general rules formed from social experience help counteract this bias.

III: Of the Corruption of Our Moral Sentiments, Which Is Occasioned by This Disposition to Admire the Rich and the Great, and to Despise or Neglect Persons of Poor and Mean Condition

Smith discusses how people desire to be respected and admired, but often pursue wealth and greatness (mere praise) rather than true virtue (praiseworthiness).

Part III: Of the Foundation of Our Judgments Concerning Our Own Sentiments and Conduct, and of the Sense of Duty

Explored in the context of self-judgment and the distinction between deserving praise and merely receiving it.

Of the Principle of Self-Approbation and of Self-Disapprobation

The chapter distinguishes between being the object of approbation and deserving it, highlighting the importance of praiseworthiness over mere praise.

II: Of the Love of Praise, and of That of Praiseworthiness; and of the Dread of Blame, and of That of Blameworthiness

The central theme of the chapter: Smith distinguishes the desire for praise (the favorable sentiments of others) from the desire for praiseworthiness (being the proper object of those sentiments), arguing the latter is primary and not derived from the former.

Of the Influence and Authority of Conscience

The chapter emphasizes the internal desire to be worthy of praise (conscience) over external approval, as seen in the dread of 'inward disgrace' and the love of 'honourable and noble' character.

Section III: Of Self-Command

The wise and virtuous man directs attention to the ideal of perfection (praiseworthiness) rather than mere comparison with others.