The Theory of Moral Sentiments · Themes
Themes & patterns
What The Theory of Moral Sentiments by Adam Smith keeps returning to.
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Theme heatmap
How major themes rise and fall across the book — a preview of the full map that sits beside the text as you read.
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| Love Desire | ||||||||||||||
| Hyperconsciousness Inaction | ||||||||||||||
| Consciousness Free Will | ||||||||||||||
| Spite Resentment |
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See full heatmapSympathy as the Foundation of Moral Judgment
Smith argues that moral judgments arise from our capacity for sympathy, or 'fellow-feeling,' where we imaginatively place ourselves in another's situation to evaluate the propriety of their emotions and actions.
Where it surfaces
- The Theory of Moral Sentiments
- Part I: Of the Propriety of Action
- Section I: Of the Sense of Propriety
- I: Of Sympathy
- Of the Pleasure of Mutual Sympathy
- Of the Manner in Which We Judge of the Propriety or Impropriety of the Affections of Other Men, by Their Concord or Dissonance with Our Own
The Impartial Spectator
Smith introduces the concept of an impartial spectator within each person, an internalized observer whose imagined perspective guides self-evaluation, self-command, and the pursuit of praiseworthiness beyond mere praise.
Where it surfaces
- The Theory of Moral Sentiments
- Part I: Of the Propriety of Action
- Section I: Of the Sense of Propriety
- Of the Manner in Which We Judge of the Propriety or Impropriety of the Affections of Other Men, by Their Concord or Dissonance with Our Own
- The Same Subject Continued
- Of the Amiable and Respectable Virtues
Virtue as Propriety and Self-Command
Virtue is defined by the propriety of emotions and actions—balancing amiable virtues like humanity with respectable virtues like self-command, and achieving harmony between the actor's sentiments and the spectator's sympathy.
Where it surfaces
- Of the Amiable and Respectable Virtues
- Section II: Of the Degrees of the Different Passions Which Are Consistent with Propriety
- Of the Passions Which Take Their Origin from the Body
- Of the Unsocial Passions
- IV: Of the Social Passions
- I: That Though Our Sympathy with Sorrow Is Generally a More Lively Sensation Than Our Sympathy with Joy, It Commonly Falls Much More Short of the Violence of What Is Naturally Felt by the Person Principally Concerned
Justice as the Pillar of Society vs. Beneficence as Ornament
Smith distinguishes justice, which is essential for society's existence and enforced by punishment, from beneficence, which is less essential and recommended but not compelled; injustice destroys society, while lack of beneficence only diminishes its comfort.
Where it surfaces
- Part II: Of Merit and Demerit; or, of the Objects of Reward and Punishment
- Section I: Of the Sense of Merit and Demerit
- I: That Whatever Appears to Be the Proper Object of Gratitude, Appears to Deserve Reward; and That, in the Same Manner, Whatever Appears to Be the Proper Object of Resentment, Appears to Deserve Punishment
- V: The Analysis of the Sense of Merit and Demerit
- Section II: Of Justice and Beneficence
- I: Comparison of Those Two Virtues
Corruption of Moral Sentiments by Wealth and Rank
Smith observes that society often admires wealth and greatness more than wisdom and virtue, leading to a corruption of moral sentiments where the rich are respected undeservedly and the poor are contemptible despite their merit.
Where it surfaces
- Section III: Of the Effects of Prosperity and Adversity Upon the Judgment of Mankind with Regard to the Propriety of Action; and Why It Is More Easy to Obtain Their Approbation in the One State Than in the Other
- II: Of the Origin of Ambition, and of the Distinction of Ranks
- III: Of the Corruption of Our Moral Sentiments, Which Is Occasioned by This Disposition to Admire the Rich and the Great, and to Despise or Neglect Persons of Poor and Mean Condition
- III: Of the Final Cause of This Irregularity of Sentiments
- Of the Beauty Which the Appearance of Utility Bestows Upon All the Productions of Art, and of the Extensive Influence of This Species of Beauty
- Section I: Of the Character of the Individual, So Far as It Affects His Own Happiness; or of Prudence
Influence of Custom and Fashion on Morality
Custom and fashion shape our notions of beauty and moral approval, leading to varied and sometimes discordant moral opinions across different ages, nations, and social ranks, though they can also reinforce natural propriety.
Desire for Praiseworthiness vs. Mere Praise
Smith distinguishes the natural desire to be worthy of praise from the desire for praise itself, arguing that true moral satisfaction comes from being praiseworthy in the eyes of the impartial spectator, not from external applause.
Where it surfaces
- III: Of the Corruption of Our Moral Sentiments, Which Is Occasioned by This Disposition to Admire the Rich and the Great, and to Despise or Neglect Persons of Poor and Mean Condition
- Part III: Of the Foundation of Our Judgments Concerning Our Own Sentiments and Conduct, and of the Sense of Duty
- Of the Principle of Self-Approbation and of Self-Disapprobation
- II: Of the Love of Praise, and of That of Praiseworthiness; and of the Dread of Blame, and of That of Blameworthiness
- Of the Influence and Authority of Conscience
- Section III: Of Self-Command