The Theory of Moral Sentiments · Character
Socrates
Athenian philosopher cited on virtue and moral inquiry.
minor
First appearance: i of those systems which make virtue consist in propriety
Socrates's tie to Alexander the Great is one of the pressures that moves The Theory of Moral Sentiments—worth meeting in the text, not only on a cast list.
Referenced for his cheerful tranquillity while drinking the poison, contrasting with his weeping friends.
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With Alexander the Great (psychological): Alexander is presented as a contrast to Socrates' philosophical self-command. In I: That Though Our Sympathy with Sorrow Is Generally a More Lively Sensation Than Our Sympathy…
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Relationship types
- Psychological
- Other
Character groups
- Classical and Modern Moral Exemplars
- Ambitious and Self-Love Figures
- Protagonist
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Open in readerNarrative arc
Story tension across the book — this chapter sits in Falling action.
- Setup
- Escalation
- Breaking point
- Aftermath
- Closing
This passage marks the dramatic climax because it crystallizes the core psychological crisis: the tension betw…
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- Alexander the Great
psychological · ambivalent
Alexander is presented as a contrast to Socrates' philosophical self-command. How this plays out →
Relationship notes
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See Socrates in i of those systems which make virtue consist in proprietyIn the story
Socrates appears across 5 companion beats. Open any chapter in the free preview to see the notes beside the text.
- I: That Though Our Sympathy with Sorrow Is Generally a More Lively Sensation Than Our Sympathy with Joy, It Commonly Falls Much More Short of the Violence of What Is Naturally Felt by the Person Principally Concerned
- III: Of the Final Cause of This Irregularity of Sentiments
- Part III: Of the Foundation of Our Judgments Concerning Our Own Sentiments and Conduct, and of the Sense of Duty
- Section I: Of the Character of the Individual, So Far as It Affects His Own Happiness; or of Prudence
- Of Those Systems Which Make Virtue Consist in Prudence
Chapter companion notes
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See Socrates in i of those systems which make virtue consist in propriety