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The Federalist Papers · Chapter

LXXVI: The Appointing Power of the Executive explained

Hamilton defends the constitutional provision for appointing officers by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.

What happens

Hamilton defends the constitutional provision for appointing officers by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. He argues that a single executive is better suited to discern merit and bear responsibility than a collective body, while the Senate's concurrence serves as a check against favoritism and ensures stability. He also addresses concerns about executive influence over the Senate, citing constitutional safeguards and the inherent integrity of a majority of senators.

Free preview opens on this chapter — companions, themes, and character notes appear beside the text.

Narrative arc

Story tension across the book — this chapter sits in Rising action.

SetupEscalationClimax
  • Setup
  • Escalation
  • Breaking point
  • Aftermath
  • Closing

This is the story's dramatic climax because Hamilton directly confronts the most emotionally charged accusatio…

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Themes in this chapter

Characters to notice

  • Publius

    The authorial voice presenting the argument for the appointing power of the executive.

  • Alexander Hamilton

    The actual author of Federalist No. 76, writing under the pseudonym Publius.

  • Congress

    Mentioned as the body that may vest appointment of inferior officers in the President, courts, or department heads.

  • The Senate

    The body whose advice and consent is required for appointments, and whose integrity and independence are defended against potential executive corruption.

  • The Judges

    Mentioned as one of the groups (Supreme Court justices) appointed by the President with Senate consent.

Key passages

  • “The sole and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty and a more exact regard to reputation.”

    A single person held fully accountable will feel a stronger sense of duty and be more careful about his reputation.

    Hamilton argues for the superiority of a single executive in making appointments.

  • “The necessity of their concurrence would have a powerful, though, in general, a silent operation. It would be an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President.”

    Requiring Senate approval would quietly but effectively restrain the President from showing favoritism.

    The Senate's role is a check on executive partiality.

  • “A man disposed to view human nature as it is, without either flattering its virtues or exaggerating its vices, will see sufficient ground of confidence in the probity of the Senate.”

    A realistic observer of human nature will find enough integrity in the Senate to trust it.

    Hamilton counters the objection that the Senate could be corrupted by the President.