A Treatise of Human Nature · Question
How does A Treatise of Human Nature develop the theme of Morality as Sentiment?
Answer
A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume develops Morality as Sentiment across the chapters the companion marks for this theme.
Virtue and vice are distinguished not by reason but by the pleasure or pain they produce in the observer, making moral judgments a matter of feeling.
Hume suggests that philosophy, if just, presents only mild and moderate sentiments, contrasting this with the dangerous errors of religion, which can disturb the conduct of life.
Hume argues that vice and virtue are distinguished by the pleasure or pain they produce, aligning with the view that moral distinctions are based on sentiment.
Virtue and vice are cited as causes of love and hatred, indicating that moral judgments are tied to emotional responses.
Evidence in the book
- Section VII: Conclusion of This Book
Hume suggests that philosophy, if just, presents only mild and moderate sentiments, contrasting this with the dangerous errors of religion, which can disturb the conduct of life.
- Section VII: Of Vice and Virtue
Hume argues that vice and virtue are distinguished by the pleasure or pain they produce, aligning with the view that moral distinctions are based on sentiment.
- Section I: Of the Object and Causes of Love and Hatred
Virtue and vice are cited as causes of love and hatred, indicating that moral judgments are tied to emotional responses.
- Section II: The Same Subject Continued
Hume argues that moral responsibility depends on the connection between actions and character, which is only possible under necessity.
- Section III: Of the Influencing Motives of the Will
The chapter lays groundwork for Hume's view that moral distinctions are based on sentiment rather than reason, as reason alone cannot influence action.
- Book III: Of Morals
The epigraph's focus on seeking the 'exemplar honesti' (model of the honorable) suggests an inquiry into the source of moral distinctions, a central concern of this book.
- Part I: Of Virtue and Vice in General
The chapter's title and focus on 'virtue and vice' suggests an exploration of moral distinctions, likely rooted in sentiment rather than reason.
- Section I: Moral Distinctions Not Derived from Reason
Hume argues that moral distinctions arise from sentiment, not reason, and that vice and virtue are perceived by feeling, not by rational demonstration.
