Morality as Sentiment

Where it surfaces

• Section VII: Conclusion of This Book

  Hume suggests that philosophy, if just, presents only mild and moderate sentiments, contrasting this with the dangerous errors of religion, which can disturb the conduct of life.

• Section VII: Of Vice and Virtue

  Hume argues that vice and virtue are distinguished by the pleasure or pain they produce, aligning with the view that moral distinctions are based on sentiment.

• Section I: Of the Object and Causes of Love and Hatred

  Virtue and vice are cited as causes of love and hatred, indicating that moral judgments are tied to emotional responses.

• Section II: The Same Subject Continued

  Hume argues that moral responsibility depends on the connection between actions and character, which is only possible under necessity.

• Section III: Of the Influencing Motives of the Will

  The chapter lays groundwork for Hume's view that moral distinctions are based on sentiment rather than reason, as reason alone cannot influence action.

• Book III: Of Morals

  The epigraph's focus on seeking the 'exemplar honesti' (model of the honorable) suggests an inquiry into the source of moral distinctions, a central concern of this book.

• Part I: Of Virtue and Vice in General

  The chapter's title and focus on 'virtue and vice' suggests an exploration of moral distinctions, likely rooted in sentiment rather than reason.

• Section I: Moral Distinctions Not Derived from Reason

  Hume argues that moral distinctions arise from sentiment, not reason, and that vice and virtue are perceived by feeling, not by rational demonstration.

• Section II: Moral Distinctions Derived from a Moral Sense

  Hume argues that moral distinctions are felt, not judged, and that virtue and vice are determined by the agreeable or uneasy sentiments they produce.

• Section I: Justice, Whether a Natural or Artificial Virtue?

  Hume emphasizes that moral approval is based on sentiments and motives, not on reason alone, and that the sense of duty can produce actions even without the natural motive.

• Section V: Of the Obligation of Promises

  Hume argues that moral obligation depends on sentiments, which cannot be changed by an act of will, thus promises cannot create natural moral obligations.

• Section VI: Some Farther Reflections Concerning Justice and Injustice

  Hume ties the sense of justice to moral sentiments that arise after conventions are established.

• Section XI: Of the Laws of Nations

  The moral obligation to justice among nations is derived from the natural obligation of interest, which gives rise to approval and disapproval through sentiment, but is weaker because the interest is less urgent.

• Part III: Of the Other Virtues and Vices

  Hume argues that moral distinctions arise from sentiment, not reason, and that virtues are qualities that produce pleasure or approval in observers.

• Section I: Of the Origin of the Natural Virtues and Vices

  Moral distinctions are based on peculiar sentiments of pleasure and pain, not on reason alone. Virtue is whatever gives pleasure by survey, and vice whatever gives pain.

• Section III: Of Goodness and Benevolence

  The chapter argues that approbation of benevolence is rooted in sentiment and immediate sympathy, not merely utility, and that tender passions naturally elicit moral praise.

• Section IV: Of Natural Abilities

  Hume argues that moral distinctions arise from the natural feelings of pleasure and pain, and that natural abilities produce approbation through similar sentiments.

• Section VI: Conclusion of This Book

  Hume concludes that moral distinctions arise from sentiment, specifically sympathy, rather than reason alone.