Dr. Hutcheson

The Theory of Moral Sentiments

Referenced as a prior moral philosopher whose views on moral sense are contrasted with Smith's sympathy-based system.

Part I: Of the Propriety of Action

Cited for his views on moral sense and the distinction between approbation and self-interest.

Section I: Of the Sense of Propriety

Cited for his view that moral approval arises from a distinct moral sense.

Section II: Of Justice and Beneficence

Mentioned in relation to the moral sense and the foundation of justice.

Part VII: Of Systems of Moral Philosophy

Hutcheson's system of moral sense and benevolence is discussed and critiqued.

Section I: Of the Questions Which Ought to Be Examined in a Theory of Moral Sentiments

Cited as an example of a philosopher who locates virtue in benevolence.

Of Those Systems Which Make Virtue Consist in Benevolence

Presented as the chief proponent of the system that virtue consists in pure and disinterested benevolence, arguing that any selfish motive diminishes merit.

Of Those Systems Which Make Reason the Principle of Approbation

Praised as the first to clearly distinguish that moral distinctions arise from immediate sense and feeling, not reason alone.

III: Of Those Systems Which Make Sentiment the Principle of Approbation

Smith discusses Hutcheson's theory of a moral sense as a reflex internal sense, distinct from self-love and reason, and critiques its implications.

Endnotes

Referenced in footnotes to the Inquiry Concerning Virtue and Illustrations on the Moral Sense.