Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus · Character

Frege

Foundational figure in logic and philosophy of language.

minor

First appearance: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

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Referenced implicitly through the discussion of logical form and the sense/reference distinction.

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Philosophical and logical influences

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Bertrand Russell
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Frege appears across 18 companion beats. Open any chapter in the free preview to see the notes beside the text.

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
Referenced implicitly through the discussion of logical form and the sense/reference distinction.
3.143
Mentioned as having mistakenly called a proposition a compounded name due to the concealment of the propositional sign's factual nature.
3.318
Mentioned as one of the thinkers whose conception of the proposition Wittgenstein adopts.
3.325
His logical symbolism is cited as an example that approaches but does not fully achieve the ideal of excluding all errors.
4.063
Referenced for his terminology of truth-value and his view that 'is true' or 'is false' are predicates of a proposition, which Wittgenstein criticizes.
4.1272
Mentioned as one who mistakenly treated formal concepts as functions or classes.
4.1273
Mentioned as one who overlooked the formal concept of the general term of a formal series.
4.431
Critiqued for his false explanation of the truth-concept, treating 'the true' and 'the false' as objects.
4.442
Criticized for his assertion sign, which Wittgenstein deems logically meaningless.
5.02
Criticized for confusing argument and index in his theory of meaning.
5.132
Mentioned as one who uses laws of inference to justify conclusions.
5.4
Mentioned as one of the philosophers whose conception of logical constants is being rejected.
5.42
Mentioned in context of logical primitive signs
5.451
Referenced for his work 'Grundgesetze der Arithmetik' on the introduction of signs by definitions, applied analogously to primitive signs.
5.4733
Frege's view that every legitimately constructed proposition must have a sense is directly addressed and contrasted with Wittgenstein's own position.
5.521
Introduced generality in connection with logical product or sum, according to Wittgenstein.
6.1271
Frege's primitive propositions and his appeal to self-evidence are discussed and critiqued.
6.232
Frege's view on meaning and sense is referenced and critiqued.

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