Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus · Chapter
3.143 explained
Wittgenstein argues that the propositional sign is a fact, but this is concealed by ordinary written or printed language, which makes a proposition appear similar to a word.
What happens
Wittgenstein argues that the propositional sign is a fact, but this is concealed by ordinary written or printed language, which makes a proposition appear similar to a word. He notes that this confusion led Frege to treat propositions as compounded names.
Free preview opens on this chapter — companions, themes, and character notes appear beside the text.
Narrative arc
Story tension across the book — this chapter sits in Exposition.
- Setup
- Escalation
- Breaking point
- Aftermath
- Closing
This passage marks the story’s dramatic climax because it presents the moment when the protagonist’s obsessive…
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Follow the arc while readingThemes in this chapter
- Picture Theory of Language
The propositional sign as a fact is foundational to the picture theory, where propositions depict states of affairs.
- Critique of Traditional Philosophy
Wittgenstein criticizes Frege's view of propositions as compounded names, highlighting a fundamental misunderstanding of logical form.
Characters to notice
- Mr. Wittgenstein
Author of the Tractatus, presenting the argument that the propositional sign is a fact.
- Frege
Mentioned as having mistakenly called a proposition a compounded name due to the concealment of the propositional sign's factual nature.
Key passages
“That the propositional sign is a fact is concealed by the ordinary form of expression, written or printed.”
The fact that a propositional sign is a fact is hidden by the usual way we write or print it.
Wittgenstein emphasizes that the true nature of propositions as facts is obscured by conventional notation.
“For in the printed proposition, for example, the sign of a proposition does not appear essentially different from a word.”
In a printed proposition, the sign looks no different from a word.
This visual similarity leads to the mistaken view that propositions are just complex names.
“Thus it was possible for Frege to call the proposition a compounded name.”
This is why Frege could think of a proposition as a compound name.
Wittgenstein points out Frege's error as a consequence of overlooking the factual nature of propositional signs.
