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Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus · Chapter

4.431 explained

Wittgenstein defines the proposition as the expression of its truth-conditions, which show agreement and disagreement with the truth-possibilities of elementary propositions.

What happens

Wittgenstein defines the proposition as the expression of its truth-conditions, which show agreement and disagreement with the truth-possibilities of elementary propositions. He critiques Frege's conception of truth, arguing that treating 'the true' and 'the false' as objects fails to determine the sense of propositions like ~p.

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Narrative arc

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  • Setup
  • Escalation
  • Breaking point
  • Aftermath
  • Closing

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Themes in this chapter

  • Logic and Tautology

    The proposition's truth-conditions are central to logical form, and Frege's error is exposed as a misunderstanding of logical objects.

  • Nonsense and Meaning

    Wittgenstein implies that treating truth-values as objects leads to nonsense, as it fails to determine the sense of propositions.

Characters to notice

  • Mr. Wittgenstein

    Author of the Tractatus, presenting the theory of truth-conditions.

  • Frege

    Critiqued for his false explanation of the truth-concept, treating 'the true' and 'the false' as objects.

Key passages

  • “The expression of the agreement and disagreement with the truth-possibilities of the elementary propositions expresses the truth-conditions of the proposition.”

    The way a proposition aligns or fails to align with the possible truth values of its basic components is what we call its truth-conditions.

    Clarifies the relationship between elementary propositions and truth-conditions.

  • “Only Frege’s explanation of the truth-concept is false: if 'the true' and 'the false' were real objects and the arguments in ~ p , etc. , then the sense of ~ p would by no means be determined by Frege’s determination.”

    Frege's account of truth is mistaken because if truth-values were objects, the meaning of a negated proposition would remain undefined.

    Highlights Wittgenstein's rejection of Frege's objectual view of truth-values.

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