A Treatise of Human Nature · Theme
Artificial Virtues and Justice
How A Treatise of Human Nature develops Artificial Virtues and Justice.
Justice is presented as an artificial virtue, arising from human conventions and self-interest rather than natural instinct, to stabilize property and society.
Where it surfaces
- Section X: Of Property and Riches
Hume references justice as potentially artificial, with property defined in relation to justice and moral equity.
- Section II: Moral Distinctions Derived from a Moral Sense
Hume hints that some virtues may be artificial, and that the sense of virtue may be partly artificial, though he defers the full discussion.
- Part II: Of Justice and Injustice
The central theme of the chapter, arguing that justice is a human invention, not a natural instinct.
- Section I: Justice, Whether a Natural or Artificial Virtue?
Hume argues that justice is an artificial virtue, arising from human conventions and necessity, not from natural motives.
- Section II: Of the Origin of Justice and Property
Justice is presented as an artificial virtue, established by convention to remedy the inconveniences of selfishness and limited generosity.
- Section III: Of the Rules Which Determine Property
Property is an artificial virtue, derived from conventions and rules of justice, not from natural instincts.
- Section IV: Of the Transference of Property by Consent
Property transfer by consent is an artificial virtue, established by utility and social convention rather than natural instinct.
- Section V: Of the Obligation of Promises
Promises are presented as an artificial virtue, invented for the convenience of society, similar to justice and property.
- Section VI: Some Farther Reflections Concerning Justice and Injustice
Hume argues that justice is an artificial virtue, derived from human conventions and not from natural motives.
- Section VII: Of the Origin of Government
Justice is presented as a set of rules upheld by government, which is an artificial invention to counter human partiality.
- Section VIII: Of the Source of Allegiance
Hume argues that allegiance to government, like justice, is an artificial virtue derived from human conventions and self-interest, not from natural moral obligations.
- Section IX: Of the Measures of Allegiance
The section explores the artificial nature of political obligation, rooted in public interest rather than natural virtue.
- Section X: Of the Objects of Allegiance
The discussion of government as a human invention for mutual advantage and the role of general rules in assigning authority reflects the artificial nature of political obligations.
- Section XI: Of the Laws of Nations
Hume extends his account of justice as an artificial virtue to the realm of nations, showing that the same conventions of property, transfer, and promises apply to states, but with weaker force due to lesser necessity.
- Section XII: Of Chastity and Modesty
Chastity and modesty are presented as artificial virtues, arising from social utility and convention rather than natural instinct.
- Section V: Some Farther Reflections Concerning the Natural Virtues
This section continues the discussion of natural virtues, contrasting them with artificial ones, and shows how the same principles of sympathy and utility apply to natural advantages.
- Section VI: Conclusion of This Book
Hume discusses justice as an artificial virtue, but insists that the sense of its morality is natural and immutable.
- Endnotes
Discusses the origin of property through relations and imagination, and the role of custom and general rules in establishing possession.