Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus · Chapter
6.1232 explained
Wittgenstein distinguishes between essential logical general validity and accidental general validity, using the example of 'all men are mortal' to illustrate the latter.
What happens
Wittgenstein distinguishes between essential logical general validity and accidental general validity, using the example of 'all men are mortal' to illustrate the latter. He argues that propositions like Russell's axiom of reducibility are not logical propositions, and if true, they are only accidentally true.
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Narrative arc
Story tension across the book — this chapter sits in Falling action.
- Setup
- Escalation
- Breaking point
- Aftermath
- Closing
This passage marks the story’s dramatic climax because it presents the moment when the protagonist’s obsessive…
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Follow the arc while readingThemes in this chapter
- Logic and Tautology
Wittgenstein distinguishes essential logical validity (tautological) from accidental general validity, critiquing non-tautological propositions like Russell's axiom.
- Critique of Traditional Philosophy
Wittgenstein challenges the logical status of Russell's axiom, showing how traditional philosophical assumptions can be mistaken for logical truths.
Characters to notice
- Mr. Wittgenstein
Author of the Tractatus, presenting his critique of logical propositions.
- Bertrand Russell
Referenced for his 'axiom of reducibility,' which Wittgenstein argues is not a logical proposition.
Key passages
“Logical general validity, we could call essential as opposed to accidental general validity, e.g. of the proposition 'all men are mortal.'”
Essential logical validity is the kind that holds necessarily, unlike accidental general validity seen in empirical generalizations like 'all men are mortal.'
Wittgenstein contrasts necessary logical truths with contingent empirical statements.
“Propositions like Russell's 'axiom of reducibility' are not logical propositions, and this explains our feeling that, if true, they can only be true by a happy chance.”
Russell's axiom of reducibility is not a genuine logical proposition; if it happens to be true, it is only by accident, not by logical necessity.
Wittgenstein dismisses the axiom as lacking the essential character of logical truths.
