Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus · Chapter
5.5422 explained
Wittgenstein argues that a correct account of propositional attitudes like 'A judges p' must logically preclude the possibility of judging nonsense, and he criticizes Russell's theory for failing to meet this requirement.
What happens
Wittgenstein argues that a correct account of propositional attitudes like 'A judges p' must logically preclude the possibility of judging nonsense, and he criticizes Russell's theory for failing to meet this requirement.
Free preview opens on this chapter — companions, themes, and character notes appear beside the text.
Narrative arc
Story tension across the book.
- Setup
- Escalation
- Breaking point
- Aftermath
- Closing
This passage marks the story’s dramatic climax because it presents the moment when the protagonist’s obsessive…
Full beat labels and climax notes unlock in the reader.
Follow the arc while readingThemes in this chapter
- Nonsense and Meaning
The passage directly addresses the impossibility of judging nonsense, linking judgment to meaningful propositions.
- Critique of Traditional Philosophy
Wittgenstein critiques Russell's theory for failing to meet a fundamental logical condition.
Characters to notice
- Mr. Wittgenstein
Author of the critique, presenting the condition for a correct explanation of judgment.
- Bertrand Russell
His theory of judgment is criticized for not showing that judging nonsense is impossible.
Key passages
“The correct explanation of the form of the proposition “ A judges p ” must show that it is impossible to judge a nonsense.”
Any proper account of what it means for someone to judge a proposition must demonstrate that one cannot judge something that is meaningless.
Wittgenstein sets a requirement for theories of judgment.
“(Russell’s theory does not satisfy this condition.)”
Russell's theory fails to meet this requirement.
Direct criticism of Russell's approach.
