Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus · Chapter
5.541 explained
Wittgenstein examines psychological propositions such as 'A thinks that p is the case,' noting that they superficially appear to represent a relation between a subject and a proposition.
What happens
Wittgenstein examines psychological propositions such as 'A thinks that p is the case,' noting that they superficially appear to represent a relation between a subject and a proposition. He criticizes the modern epistemological treatment of these propositions by Russell and Moore, which conceives them as relational.
Free preview opens on this chapter — companions, themes, and character notes appear beside the text.
Narrative arc
Story tension across the book — this chapter sits in Falling action.
- Setup
- Escalation
- Breaking point
- Aftermath
- Closing
This passage marks the story’s dramatic climax because it presents the moment when the protagonist’s obsessive…
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Follow the arc while readingThemes in this chapter
- Critique of Traditional Philosophy
Wittgenstein challenges the relational interpretation of psychological propositions prevalent in modern epistemology.
Characters to notice
- Mr. Wittgenstein
Author of the Tractatus, presenting his critique of psychological proposition forms.
- Bertrand Russell
Mentioned as a modern epistemologist who conceives psychological propositions relationally.
Key passages
“At first sight it appears as if there were also a different way in which one proposition could occur in another. Especially in certain propositional forms of psychology, like “ A thinks, that p is the case,” or “ A thinks p ”, etc. Here it appears superficially as if the proposition p stood to the object A in a kind of relation.”
It initially seems that a proposition can be embedded within another in a special way, particularly in psychological statements such as 'A thinks that p is true' or 'A thinks p,' where it looks like p is related to A.
Wittgenstein identifies the superficial appearance of a relation between a thinking subject and a proposition.
“(And in modern epistemology (Russell, Moore, etc. ) those propositions have been conceived in this way.)”
Contemporary epistemologists like Russell and Moore have indeed interpreted these psychological propositions as expressing a relation between a subject and a proposition.
Wittgenstein references Russell and Moore as proponents of the relational view he is critiquing.
