Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus · Chapter
5.4731 explained
Wittgenstein argues that self-evidence, as emphasized by Russell, is unnecessary in logic because language itself prevents logical mistakes.
What happens
Wittgenstein argues that self-evidence, as emphasized by Russell, is unnecessary in logic because language itself prevents logical mistakes. The a priori nature of logic is grounded in the impossibility of thinking illogically.
Free preview opens on this chapter — companions, themes, and character notes appear beside the text.
Narrative arc
Story tension across the book.
- Setup
- Escalation
- Breaking point
- Aftermath
- Closing
This passage marks the story’s dramatic climax because it presents the moment when the protagonist’s obsessive…
Full beat labels and climax notes unlock in the reader.
Follow the arc while readingThemes in this chapter
- Limits of Language and Thought
The impossibility of thinking illogically demonstrates the inherent limits of thought imposed by language.
- Logic and Tautology
Logic's a priori nature is tied to the tautological structure that prevents logical error.
Characters to notice
- Mr. Wittgenstein
Author of the Tractatus, presenting his critique of Russell's notion of self-evidence.
- Bertrand Russell
Referenced for his extensive discussion of self-evidence in logic.
Key passages
“Self-evidence, of which Russell has said so much, can only be discard in logic by language itself preventing every logical mistake.”
The concept of self-evidence that Russell emphasizes is unnecessary because language inherently prevents logical errors.
Wittgenstein dismisses self-evidence as a redundant notion in logic.
“That logic is a priori consists in the fact that we cannot think illogically.”
The a priori nature of logic is simply that illogical thinking is impossible.
Wittgenstein grounds the a priori status of logic in the impossibility of illogical thought.
