Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus · Chapter
4.064 explained
Wittgenstein argues that a proposition must already possess a sense prior to any act of assertion or denial; assertion does not confer sense but rather asserts the sense that is already there.
What happens
Wittgenstein argues that a proposition must already possess a sense prior to any act of assertion or denial; assertion does not confer sense but rather asserts the sense that is already there.
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Narrative arc
Story tension across the book.
- Setup
- Escalation
- Breaking point
- Aftermath
- Closing
This passage marks the story’s dramatic climax because it presents the moment when the protagonist’s obsessive…
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Follow the arc while readingThemes in this chapter
- Nonsense and Meaning
The proposition's sense is intrinsic, not bestowed by assertion.
Characters to notice
- Mr. Wittgenstein
Author of the proposition that sense precedes assertion.
Key passages
“Every proposition must already have a sense; assertion cannot give it a sense, for what it asserts is the sense itself.”
A proposition's meaning is inherent; asserting it does not create its meaning but merely affirms the meaning it already has.
Clarifies that sense is a precondition of assertion, not a product of it.