The Problems of Philosophy · Characters
Character guide
Key figures in The Problems of Philosophy by Bertrand Russell.
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Immanuel Kant
supporting
Also known as Kant
Kant arrives in Russell's argument at the moment the problem of a priori knowledge becomes acute: how can we know, before meeting them, that any two future Londoners plus two more will make four? His answer—that space, time, and causality are contributions of our own nature, while the 'thing in itself' stays forever out of reach—is the boldest solution on offer. Russell admires its ingenuity even as he dismantles it, making Kant the indispensable sparring partner for anyone who wants to see how far the mind's furniture can be trusted.
Descartes
supporting
Descartes sets the tone for the whole inquiry: the opening question of whether any knowledge is certain enough that no reasonable man could doubt it is essentially his. His method of doubt turns the familiar table, the sun, the chair beneath us into problems, and his cogito becomes the first foothold Russell tests rather than simply accepts. He matters because he makes radical doubt feel like a procedure rather than a mood—and because the book's early chapters are, in effect, a running conversation with his demand for foundations.
Bishop Berkeley
supporting
Also known as Berkeley
Berkeley holds that colours, sounds, and shapes cannot exist apart from a mind, since what we apprehend is always an 'idea.' Russell grants the force of the position and then locates its flaw: Berkeley confuses the act of apprehension, which is mental, with the object apprehended, which need not be. The distinction matters enormously, because on it rests the mind's whole power to be acquainted with something other than itself. Berkeley is the book's most instructive wrong turn—wrong in a way that sharpens what knowledge actually is.
Plato
supporting
Plato stands behind Russell's discussion of universals, the realm of abstract entities that mathematics and language seem to require. His vision of an open world of free possibilities—where much remains unknown because there is so much to know—echoes through the book's closing reflections on why philosophy is worth studying at all. He matters because he supplies the alternative to pure empiricism: the idea that some things are known not by encounter but by reason, and that this knowledge is what gives unity to the sciences.
Socrates
minor
Classical Greek philosopher referenced in discussions of universals.
Leibniz
minor
Rationalist philosopher whose principle of sufficient reason is mentioned.
Hume
supporting
Hume is the quiet destabilizer of the book's middle chapters: if all knowledge comes from experience, what justifies our confidence that the sun will rise tomorrow or that one event causes another? Russell treats Hume's skepticism not as a dead end but as the honest residue that philosophy must confront, and his questions about induction and causation shape the problem of our knowledge of the external world. He matters because he shows how far empiricism can go before it begins to undermine itself—and because Russell's own answers are measured against that limit.
Hegel
minor
German idealist philosopher briefly critiqued for his view of reality.
Charles I
minor
Also known as Charles
English king used as an example of historical knowledge.
Bismarck
minor
German statesman used as an example in knowledge by description.
Othello
minor
Shakespearean character used as an example of acquaintance.
Desdemona
minor
Shakespearean character used as an example of acquaintance.
Cassio
minor
Shakespearean character used as an example of acquaintance.
George IV
minor
British king used as an example in a logical puzzle.
Jones
minor
Hypothetical person used in examples about knowledge.
Brown
minor
Hypothetical person used in examples about knowledge.
Robinson
minor
Hypothetical person used in examples about knowledge.
Smith
minor
Hypothetical person used in examples about knowledge.
Hylas
minor
Fictional interlocutor in Berkeley's dialogues, referenced in discussion.
Julius Caesar
minor
Roman emperor used as an example in knowledge by description.