Philosophical Works · Chapter
XXXIV explained
Descartes explains that judgment requires both the understanding (to apprehend something) and the will (to assent to it), and that a perfect apprehension is not necessary for forming a judgment.
What happens
Descartes explains that judgment requires both the understanding (to apprehend something) and the will (to assent to it), and that a perfect apprehension is not necessary for forming a judgment.
Free preview opens on this chapter — companions, themes, and character notes appear beside the text.
Narrative arc
Story tension across the book — this chapter sits in Exposition.
- Setup
- Escalation
- Breaking point
- Aftermath
- Closing
This passage marks the story's dramatic climax because it presents the precise moment of epistemological crisi…
Full beat labels and climax notes unlock in the reader.
Follow the arc while readingThemes in this chapter
- Reason and Method
The chapter discusses the roles of understanding and will in the process of judgment, a key aspect of Descartes' method.
- Skepticism and Certainty
The chapter addresses how judgment can occur even with obscure and confused knowledge, touching on the limits of certainty.
Characters to notice
- Narrator
The narrator presents the argument that both understanding and will are necessary for judgment.
Key passages
“I admit that the understanding is necessary for judging, there being no room to suppose that we can judge of that which we in no way apprehend; but the will also is required in order to our assenting to what we have in any degree perceived.”
Understanding is needed to grasp something before we can judge it, but the will is also needed to give our assent to what we perceive, even partially.
Descartes distinguishes the roles of intellect and will in forming judgments.
“It is not necessary, however, at least to form any judgment whatever, that we have an entire and perfect apprehension of a thing; for we may assent to many things of which we have only a very obscure and confused knowledge.”
We don't need complete and clear knowledge of something to judge it; we can agree to many things we only dimly and confusedly understand.
Descartes notes that imperfect understanding still allows for judgment.
